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May [God’s] great name be magnified and sanctified…
May [God’s] great name be blessed forever and for all eternity.
May the name of the Holy One be blessed and praised and 
glorified and exalted and extolled and honored and lifted up and 
lauded—beyond all of the blessings and hymns and praises and 
consolations that are spoken in the world.
–The Kaddish
I think of the process of learning as always having the potential to be 
a process of encountering God, and I see this potential highlighted by 
the Jewish practice of reciting the doxology known as “the Kaddish” 
to conclude an experience of study.1  While the Kaddish is popularly 
associated with prayer services and with mourning, it has a long 
history of being used to conclude an experience of study. The core 
words of the Kaddish, “May [God’s] great name be blessed forever 
and for all eternity,” and the subsequent words of the Kaddish that 
speak of the transcendence of “the name of the Holy One,” can play 
an especially important role in connecting experiences of learning to 
the moral ideal that God’s name represents.
 One of the oldest sources to invoke these words of the Kaddish is 
a passage in the Babylonian Talmud2 that reflects on the darkness of 
the centuries following the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. 
The fourth-century sage Rava is said to have claimed that, even 
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amidst the chaos of destruction, “the world is sustained…by the 
[words of ] sanctification (k’dushah) after study and by [the words] 
‘May [God’s] great name…’ after the study of aggadah”—the study 
of sacred narratives or other non-legal discourse. Rava’s prooftext is 
Job 10:22, in which Job envisions “a land whose light is like darkness, 
the deepest gloom and disorder.” Rava goes on to affirm that proper 
study—described with the word “order” (sidra in Aramaic, seder in 
Hebrew)—can provide light and reverse such disorder and darkness. 
But it appears from this passage that it is not just study itself, but 
rather the doxologies of sanctification (Kedushah or Kaddish) and 
the key words invoking God’s “great name” following study that 
provided Rava with an experience of light that seemed to sustain the 
world. The expression of hope for God’s great name to be blessed for 
eternity appears to have connected the experience of learning with 
the light provided by the “great name” of the Eternal.
God’s Name and the Idea of the Good
What is God’s “great name”? A long-standing Jewish tradition 
suggests that God’s name cannot be fully articulated, but that human 
beings can use names that point toward the transcendent. Among the 
names invoked by traditional Jewish liturgy, I will focus on one that 
is of particular significance for reflections on learning: “the Good” 
(ha-tov). This name is given particular prominence in the Amidah, 
the silent prayer traditionally recited three times daily, which includes 
the declaration that “your name is the Good” (ha-tov shimkha). “It is 
fitting to give praise,” the liturgy goes on to say, to God as known by 
this name.
 Some Jews view the declaration that God’s name is “the Good” 
as a declaration that God is a person, being, or force characterized 
by goodness. I do not, as I do not think that any person, being, or 
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force deserves the ultimate devotion that Jewish law and liturgy see 
as appropriate to give to God. The particular Jewish philosophical 
tradition within which I locate myself suggests that God is not a 
person or being or force at all. Rather, God should be identified with 
“the Idea of the Good”—an infinite goodness that goes beyond the 
limited goodness that human beings can describe but that constitutes 
a moral ideal toward which all human beings should strive. “We can 
conceive of [God] only as we conceive of the Idea of the Good,” as 
Hermann Cohen put it. “This is the simple, profound, true meaning 
of God’s transcendence. God is in truth ‘beyond me,’ for [God] is the 
Holy One, the archetype of all human morality.”3 
 God’s goodness is “holy,” separate from and transcending all 
human goodness but representing a moral ideal or archetype toward 
which human beings must continually aspire. What the Kaddish calls 
“the name of the Holy One” is “the Good,” “the Idea of the Good” 
or, as Cohen puts it at one point, “the infinitely Good.”4 These are 
names that I think are appropriate to identify with “the great name 
of God” invoked by the Kaddish, for they are names that help us to 
understand that ultimate praise should be offered not to any “being” 
(whether tending toward omnipotence or impotence) or any “force” 
(whether a consciousness found in the world or a power found in our 
own inclinations), but only to an ideal of perfection that invites our 
continual reflection and moral growth.
 We humans tend too often, I think, to worship gods that are easy 
to relate to because they are made in the image of our own ideals and 
identities. I honor the value of such worship and of God-language 
that is calibrated to human needs, desires, and cultures, as all language 
must be—for in using God-language, we must “speak in the language 
of human beings,” to use the rabbinic phrase favored by Maimonides.5 
But the Jewish tradition of worshipping God by the name of “the 
Good”—as the “Idea of the Good,” as an ideal of absolute goodness—
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offers a helpful challenge to these honorable tendencies. The continual 
reminders within Jewish tradition to “turn toward God” have greater 
moral power when that to which we are turning is not an entity that 
reflects our needs but an ideal that exceeds our needs. When studying 
traditions that stem from particular human perspectives, it is good to 
lift up our eyes toward an ideal that transcends those perspectives. It is 
fitting to remind ourselves of a moral archetype of ultimate goodness 
that continually challenges us to look beyond ourselves, our cultures, 
and the natural world and instead toward greater moral goodness. It 
is “fitting to give praise” to such an ideal, keeping it in our minds and 
hearts, turning toward its infinite light with love, reverence, and a 
longing for moral improvement.
 Practices of study can, I think, point us toward this ideal. In 
considering God as “the Good,” Hermann Cohen pointed to 
Maimonides’ emphasis on study—not just of halakhah but also of 
aggadah, and not just of “Torah” in a narrow sense but also of “wisdom” 
in a broad sense.6 Maimonides built on aggadic traditions, Cohen 
contends, in developing his vision of the Torah as directing Jews 
to seek the greatest moral wisdom, which culminates in seeing the 
archetypal “lovingkindness, justice, and righteousness” toward which 
human beings must aspire.7 Moral wisdom that seeks such ideals is 
the ultimate goal of the Torah, and the Torah’s truth claims must 
be justified by critical philosophical inquiry, as “it is wisdom which 
must verify the teachings of the Torah through true speculation.”8 
Cohen also pointed to Maimonides’ claim that turning toward a 
true vision of the Good requires scientific inquiry into the nature 
of the world, for a commitment to truth will also yield longing and 
praise for God’s great name: “When a person contemplates [God’s] 
works…he will immediately love and praise and glorify and long with 
a great longing to know [God’s] great name….When he thinks of 
these things themselves, he will immediately recoil with fear and be 
conscious that he is a small, lowly, obscure creature, with extremely 
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little understanding, standing before Perfect Understanding.”9 Here, 
scientific learning reminds one of the extreme limits of one’s vision; 
but it also leads to praise of God’s great name and a longing to know 
that name—a desire for further understanding of God’s perfection, 
what Maimonides calls “great longing to know [God’s] great name.”
 This same longing can be found in the words of the Kaddish, the 
meditation that connects study to the hope that God’s “great name 
be blessed forever and for all eternity.” Crucially, the words of the 
Kaddish go on to emphasize that God’s name transcends the limited 
descriptions that human beings can offer. Blessing God’s name 
“forever and for all eternity” requires awareness that human language 
is inadequate for speaking of infinite goodness. Thus the Kaddish 
continues with a prayer: “May the name of the Holy One be blessed 
and praised and glorified and exalted and extolled and honored and 
lifted up and lauded—beyond all of the blessings and hymns and 
praises and consolations that are spoken in the world.” The ultimate 
moral goodness of “God’s name” that Cohen described as “beyond 
me” is, indeed, beyond all that human beings can articulate. It is like 
a shining light toward which we are called—but our own vision will 
always be limited and can never describe the fullness of that light. 
As much as we strive to make God’s name known in the world, as 
much as we can strive to increase goodness in the world through our 
learning and through our deeds, there is always more goodness that 
is beyond our reach.
Study and the Philosophic Quest
Most human beings, Maimonides claims in his Guide of the Perplexed, 
“grope about in [the] night…‘they know not, neither do they 
understand; they go about in darkness’ (Psalm 82:5). The truth, in spite 
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of the strength of its manifestation, is entirely hidden from them, as is 
said of them: ‘And now men see not the light which is bright in the 
skies’ ( Job 38:21).”10 Rare individuals may see glimpses of light as from 
a luminous stone, or even as from a lightning flash: “sometimes truth 
flashes out so that we think that it is day” before “we find ourselves again 
in an obscure night.” For prophets, however, “lightning flashes time and 
time again,” and the greatest of prophets, Moses, apparently could see 
sufficient light that “night appears to him as day.” But even Moses was 
not able to fully apprehend God’s perfect goodness.11 As Maimonides 
describes it elsewhere, prophets are inevitably separated from God by 
“veils”—their moral vices—and even Moses is separated from God, 
despite his virtue.12 No human being is able to see God directly: “You 
cannot see My face,” God tells Moses after the sin of the golden calf, 
“for none may see Me and live” (Exodus 33:20). Israel has engaged in 
worship of a golden calf, perhaps attempting to worship God through 
bowing down to the form of the calf; God’s response might serve to 
remind Moses and the people of Israel that God transcends any form.13 
Nonetheless, God affirms that Moses can perceive some glimpse of 
God’s transcendent goodness, which is identified with God’s great 
name. “I will pass My goodness before you, and I will proclaim before 
you the name of the Eternal” (Exodus 33:19),14 God tells Moses. Moses 
does perceive the great name and the qualities of God’s transcendent 
goodness; in Maimonides’ explanation, what he sees are moral ideals of 
“lovingkindness, justice, and righteousness” that exceed human reach 
but that provide an archetype toward which humans should aspire.15
 Maimonides’ vision of how human beings may encounter God 
draws on Plato’s allegorical description of “our nature in its education 
and want of education,”16 an allegory regarding the Idea of the Good 
that is also central for later Jewish thinkers like Cohen. The allegory 
describes human beings as bound within a cave, with a fire behind 
them, and puppeteers using the light of the fire to project images onto 
the blank wall in front of the prisoners. Unaware of the puppeteers, 
313         The Kaddish, the Allegory of the Cave, and the Golden Calf
the prisoners understand the shadows on the wall in front of them 
to be undeniably real and true. True reality lies outside of the cave, 
where the sun—the Idea of the Good—may be found. But nearly 
all human beings are trapped within our cultures, unaware even of 
how our own fundamental beliefs, values, and myths are constructed 
by those “puppeteers” who have the power to teach us, and whose 
teachings may simply reflect their own selfish desires for power.17 
 The philosopher Socrates, the character who offers this allegory 
in Plato’s Republic, imagines that there are rare individuals skilled in 
the art of “turning around,” who can go through the painful process 
of detaching themselves from their cultures, climbing out of the cave; 
these are people whom Socrates calls philosophers.18 Philosophers 
may gain some glimpse of the Good beyond the cave. They might, 
then, be compelled to return to their caves and gain control over the 
kinds of ideas and myths that are projected onto the wall of the cave. 
A philosopher could translate his insights from the outside world 
into narratives that could help to improve ordinary human life.
 Plato depicts Socrates as compelled to do this work; Maimonides, 
in turn, envisions Moses as compelled to do this work. Just as Socrates 
must exercise great care in bringing his insights to the people of 
Athens, Moses must exercise great care in bringing his insights to 
the people of Israel, translating the infinite Good (God) into myths 
and rituals that his people can understand. The Torah of Moses 
takes human weaknesses into account, Maimonides argues, helping 
them to grow toward God while recognizing that “man, according 
to his nature, is not capable of abandoning suddenly all to which he 
was accustomed.”19 Bringing the people toward God must happen 
gradually, making many concessions to the weaknesses of human 
nature and to the particularities of Israelite culture—the Torah must, 
in the language that Maimonides favors, “speak in the language 
of human beings.” Thus, for example, Maimonides viewed many 
commandments regarding worship—such as the use of language in 
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prayer and, all the more so, the establishment of a sacrificial cult at a 
central shrine (eventually located in Jerusalem)—as concessions that 
would help the Israelites to avoid idolatry and focus on God.20 The 
commandments are not perfect in and of themselves, but they are 
a means to an end: studying and performing the Torah’s imperfect 
commandments help to bring human beings toward the perfection 
that God’s name represents. Using the language of the Kaddish, we 
might say that studying the Torah brings people into contact with 
hymns and consolations that are developed for this world; but the 
process of study can also direct people toward an ideal of goodness, 
the holy name that goes beyond all of the blessings, hymns, praises, 
and consolations that are molded to fit the world.
 Plato’s Republic makes it clear that those who expose how 
myths and norms are constructed by “puppeteer” mythmakers and 
legislators will be viewed as grave threats to those who live within the 
cave, whether as puppeteers or as prisoners. Directing those within a 
culture to the universal goodness that lies beyond the constructions 
of a culture’s particular political life—trying to release prisoners from 
their shackles—would result in the murder of a philosopher who 
(like Socrates) sought to release the prisoners. “If they were somehow 
able to get their hands on and kill the man who attempts to release 
and lead up, wouldn’t they kill him?”21 The Republic indicates that if 
philosophers are to have any power within a city, they must not engage 
in this kind of effort to free prisoners, but must instead accommodate 
themselves to the city’s cultural norms and practical needs. Though 
any effort to be involved in gaining the power necessary to influence 
a culture would be unappealing to a true philosopher and would 
in any case corrupt that philosopher, Socrates continues to raise 
the possibility that philosophers should bring their insights to the 
political realm—perhaps making some improvement in the life of 
the city, perhaps creating a climate that will be friendly to the quest 
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for the Good that philosophers like Socrates seek to undertake. The 
society shaped by the philosopher will inevitably be far from perfect, 
though. And even the greatest philosophers will be far from the 
Good, just as Socrates himself is always aware of his own ignorance, 
never satisfied with himself but always striving for further knowledge 
and virtue. Socrates shows how the process of learning always reveals 
new questions and the longing for greater growth.22 
 Plato’s discussion of the relationship between human beings and 
the Good is paralleled by Maimonides’ discussion of the relationship 
between human beings and God. Just as the philosopher, like Socrates, 
can ascend out of the cave and strive toward the Good, Moses can 
ascend Mount Sinai and strive to see God as clearly as possible—
even if, in the end, he cannot see God’s face. Just as the philosopher 
might ideally create myths that might bring his community closer to 
the Good, Moses creates myths that might help his community to 
gradually turn toward the Good—that is, toward God. And just as 
a city would seek to reject and even murder a philosopher who tried 
too overtly to release prisoners from their shackles, the people of 
Israel repeatedly rebel against the threat that Moses represents.
 When he brings the people to Mount Sinai and asks them to 
devote themselves to God, Moses might seem, at least at first, to 
be asking Israel to “abandon suddenly all to which they were 
accustomed.” The Torah that he brings from Sinai threatens to 
disrupt the lives of the people of Israel and asks them to turn away 
from all that they know. And the people are “stiff-necked” (Exodus 
32:9), as God will go on to observe. They will do what they can to 
resist the call to change. Perhaps the Torah is especially threatening 
to those who would otherwise want to have power, and who resist 
the idea that Moses can, like a philosopher, ascend and gain radical 
insights into the Good that will demand a total restructuring of 
power among the people of Israel.
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 Indeed, one midrashic tradition suggests that the people of Israel 
respond to the threat of the Torah of Moses just as the people of 
Athens respond to the threat of the philosophy of Socrates: seeking 
to kill those who challenge the establishment. According to the 
midrash, Moses’ brother Aaron and his nephew Hur, both prophets 
themselves, are left in Moses’ place when the latter is on Mount Sinai, 
and the people rise up and kill Hur. Hur was guilty of challenging 
and rebuking the people when they sought to build and worship a 
golden calf, turning away from God and toward an idol. According 
to this tradition, “Aaron feared” (Exodus 32:5, as understood by the 
midrash) that the people would seek to kill him as well, and he seeks 
to save his life by making a concession to the needs of the people, 
supporting their efforts to build and worship the golden calf. Aaron 
saves his own life, and perhaps Moses’ life as well, by conceding to the 
mob and supporting their idolatry.23 
 This tradition makes use of the ambiguities in the Hebrew 
narrative regarding the golden calf, explains why the character of 
Hur seems to disappear from the narrative, and, above all, helps to 
exonerate Aaron, explaining why it might be that such an admirable 
figure would seem to take the lead in efforts to worship the calf. The 
midrash might also lead us to see Aaron as in fact doing what we 
might see Moses as learning to do: making concessions to the people 
of Israel, supporting the development of imperfect traditions amidst a 
climate where prophets might be killed for the challenges they pose.24 
Perhaps, in fact, Moses learned to make concessions based on the 
model of Aaron. According to one reading of Maimonides—found 
in the writings of Isaac Abravanel—it is precisely the episode of the 
golden calf and the resulting political climate that causes the Torah 
of Moses to be filled with the concessions that it contains. While 
Moses cannot tolerate Aaron’s concessions in building a golden calf, 
he realizes that the people of Israel require more tangible forms of 
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worship, and so he introduces concessions that include not only 
sacrificial worship but, in fact, nearly all of the rituals of the Torah.25 
 After his vision of God’s transcendent moral ideals, and his 
discovery that God is willing to make concessions despite Israel’s 
sinfulness, Moses returns from his encounter with the Good with 
a new vision for how to bring flashes of divine light into the reality 
in which Israel lives. He has encountered the light of the Good 
such that “the skin of his face sent forth beams” (Exodus 34:29)—as 
Maimonides explains, such that “night appears to him as day.”26 I 
imagine that Moses discovered a new vision of how the people might 
gradually be guided to the encounter with God through a Torah that 
will speak in the language of human beings. The traditions that the 
people of Israel will practice and study will, from this point on, be 
like shadows projected against a cave wall by a prophetic puppeteer. 
They offer great potential for teaching the people of Israel about a 
God who transcends all human descriptions; but their potential is 
magnified if they are studied with the reminder of the Kaddish that 
God transcends the Torah and reaches “beyond all of the blessings 
and hymns and praises and consolations that are spoken in the world.”
The Potential for Growth After the Golden Calf
The study of Torah has the potential to inspire growth and to remind 
people of the Good in this way, magnifying God’s great name. By way 
of example, I have suggested how studying the golden calf narrative 
can help to remind its readers that although the Torah is not in itself 
perfect, it can point to the transcendence of which the Kaddish speaks. 
Staying with this example, I would add that studying the narrative of 
the golden calf can also remind people of the obligation to continually 
grow and strive toward an overarching moral ideal, guiding them away 
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from the shadows on the wall and toward a greater light.
 Rabbi Simḥah Zissel Ziv, one of the leading figures in the 
nineteenth-century Musar movement—a movement characterized by 
its relentless focus on seeking continual growth of moral character—
saw this as the core message of the golden calf narrative.27 As Simḥah 
Zissel notes, God’s language (in Exodus 32:9–10) threatening to 
destroy Israel after their worship of the golden calf does not mention 
idolatry or the calf, but only that Israel “is a stiff-necked people”:
We should contemplate with understanding that [God] 
did not mention the fact of this great sin [with the calf ], 
but only mentioned that this was a stiff-necked people. The 
explanation of the matter is that [Israel] was not able to turn 
its neck to listen, meaning it was not able to turn from the 
habit to which it had been habituated. And, God forbid, on 
account of this it was far from turning [t’shuvah; repentance]…
for the character trait of stiffening against changing one’s 
nature was worse than the great sin of the calf; were it not 
for this character trait, they would not have been fit to be 
destroyed.28 
Israel is, here, collectively fixed in their habits, refusing to grow, 
refusing to turn to God. “They did not continue to grow and learn,” as 
Simḥah Zissel puts it elsewhere, “and the essence of what the blessed 
Holy One loves is that one continues to grow and learn.”29 Israel 
showed no willingness to listen to criticism and instead responded 
to the criticism of Hur with hatred and violence: as Simḥah Zissel 
notes, “being stiff-necked is not continuing to learn, and therefore 
hating in the depths of one’s heart the one who criticizes him.”30 
 But many among the people of Israel who responded to Hur’s 
criticism with hatred come to heed Moses’ criticism, and they 
discover what Simḥah Zissel describes as “love of reproof.”31 They 
escape destruction, as they find that accepting and loving the criticism 
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offered by a prophet can help them to move forward in their process 
of personal growth. Above all, Simḥah Zissel suggests, prophets can 
help the people of Israel understand how and why God needs them to 
grow in key virtues such as lovingkindness, compassion, and justice.32 
The best of prophets, like Moses, can accommodate the needs of the 
people and gradually help them to turn their heads and listen to the 
voices that challenge them to grow. To use the language of Plato, the 
best of philosophers, like Socrates, can gradually help the people of 
the city to turn toward the Good.
 Indeed, Simḥah Zissel himself was struck by the way in which the 
figure of Socrates seemed to resemble an ideal Jewish sage who does 
not claim firm knowledge but always seeks to learn and progress 
toward greater goodness:
It is an amazing thing that the philosopher Socrates said: 
“There are people who need to [claim to] know everything 
that is asked of them, for without this one is not a wise man. 
But I do not say this; [rather] all of my wisdom is that I 
know that I do not know.” These are the words of the sage, 
Socrates. Accordingly, we have said, this is the reason that 
the sages in the Talmud are always called “the disciples of 
the sages” [talmidei ḥakhamim]…for all of their days, they 
are like disciples who are learning.33 
From this perspective, the challenge offered by rabbinic sages and 
philosophers—and by prophets—requires that human beings 
acknowledge the limitations of their knowledge and commit to 
continual learning and growth. Israel, at the time of the golden calf, 
responded to this challenge by retorting that they did not want to join 
any quest for the Good that would disrupt their entrenched habits. 
But Moses ultimately persuaded the people to join him on a path of 
becoming “disciples”—not sages but “disciples of sages”—in the style 
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of Socrates, who would always be seeking greater and greater wisdom. 
The path of continual study that they agreed to embark upon is a path 
of magnifying and sanctifying God’s name—not because it claims 
knowledge, but because it accepts that humans must always seek 
greater growth. The process of learning should always be connected 
with the experience at Sinai, through which the people of Israel 
acknowledged their limited perspective and learned to turn from the 
golden calf—and toward “the name of the Holy One” which called 
them higher and higher, “beyond all of the blessings and hymns and 
praises and consolations that are spoken in the world.”
 During the Days of Repentance and on Yom Kippur, the Day 
of Atonement, the days on the Jewish calendar that commemorate 
the culmination of Israel’s repentance and forgiveness following the 
episode of the golden calf,34 it is appropriate that the words of the 
Kaddish are traditionally modified to even further emphasize God’s 
greatness, proclaiming that God’s name points “beyond—and further 
beyond—all of the blessings” and other worldly creations. When we 
focus on the potential for growth after the golden calf episode, we 
should be reminded all the more of God’s infinite goodness and 
the corollary that one must “continue to grow and learn,” reaching 
beyond and even further beyond our ordinary inclinations. It is fitting 
to conclude one’s study of the golden calf narrative with the words of 
the Kaddish, which can remind us to challenge our assumptions in 
light of the Good that is beyond being.
Historical-Critical Scholarship 
and Its Challenge to Pious Certainty
Simḥah Zissel Ziv and the Musar movement thus developed a model 
of education that would help to inspire continual moral growth. 
And Simḥah Zissel criticized those whom he saw as rejecting that 
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model and instead credulously accepting unjustified assumptions 
that limited their vision. He criticized traditionalist Jewish scholars 
whom he saw as valorizing talmudic scholarship but as unwilling to 
engage in the continual work of developing moral virtue, and he also 
criticized more liberal Jewish scholars whom he saw as credulously 
accepting the assumptions of Western culture. Simḥah Zissel hoped 
that reflective meditation35 on texts like the golden calf narrative 
could inspire Jews to be scholars of a different sort, who would—like 
the classical rabbinic sages, like Socrates, or like Moses or other great 
prophets—continually question their assumptions and continually 
seek to grow in virtue.
 But traditionalists like Simḥah Zissel, of course, refused to 
question their own dogmatic assumptions about the Torah in general 
or the golden calf narrative in particular. Simḥah Zissel may have 
encouraged questioning assumptions, but he also asked his students 
to have certainty about core values and not simply to claim ignorance. 
Like other traditional readers of the Torah, he wanted his students 
to stand firmly on the right side of the battle that is described in 
the golden calf narrative, and not to be like the people of Israel who 
floundered in their ignorance and uncertainty, building a calf because 
they “[did] not know what happened” to Moses (Exodus 32:1).
 Indeed, the golden calf narrative seems constructed to demand 
certainty, not endless questioning. Once Moses returns from the 
mountain, the people of Israel are expected to choose sides in the 
battle between Moses and those who support idolatry. Moses calls 
out, “Whoever is for the Eternal, come here!” (Exodus 32:26), and 
those who do not come over to his side are sentenced to death. One 
might imagine an Israelite in the likeness of Socrates who does not 
claim knowledge of whether Moses is in the right but, rather, would 
want to question him carefully. Such a philosophic soul would likely 
be marked for death. In the Torah’s account, Moses immediately 
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orders the Levites who rally to his side to go and slaughter the three 
thousand Israelites who do not show their loyalty to God and to him: 
“Each of you put sword on thigh, go back and forth from gate to gate 
throughout the camp, and slay brother, neighbor, and kin” (Exodus 
32:27).36
 Simḥah Zissel saw justice in these efforts to divide the righteous 
from the wicked. Yes, he would point out, one should continually 
question and seek greater learning—but proper learning demands 
that one accept certain self-evident truths. Questioning Moses, 
questioning God, or questioning the perfection of the Torah was 
obviously inappropriate from his traditionalist perspective. True 
“disciples of the sages” must be humble, and their humility should 
not lead them to question their dedication to God’s will as expressed 
in the Torah but should instead lead them to submit to it. God’s 
name is sanctified and magnified through the study of Torah, from 
this perspective, precisely because the reader submits to God’s will as 
found in the Torah.37 
 But an alternative path of study that I think better helps us to turn 
toward the Good acknowledges that the Torah does not perfectly 
capture God’s will. The sort of epistemic humility attributed to 
Socrates—and, here, to the rabbinic sages, and to Moses—should 
encourage us to question our assumptions, to learn with openness 
and honesty—and thus to turn our necks to hear critical analyses 
regarding the formation of texts and traditions. Critical study of this 
sort may help us to turn toward “the name of the Holy One,” that 
name which is “beyond all of the blessings and hymns and praises 
and consolations that are spoken in the world.”
 When one studies the golden calf narrative from the perspective 
of historical-critical scholarship, rejecting traditionalist assumptions 
about biblical authorship and seeking to discover the original contexts 
in which the Bible was composed, the narrative is easily seen as 
reflecting a variety of political agendas of interest to the various authors 
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who may have contributed to its formation. Indeed, for many religious 
studies scholars who teach in contemporary academic contexts, the 
golden calf episode can be a key text in helping students to question 
assumptions about the unity and perfection of Scripture and in seeing 
the likely political motivation of biblical authors.38 It is not easy to 
disentangle layers of sources within the golden calf narrative, and 
historical-critical approaches to the narrative yield few certainties, 
but such approaches do suggest that it is possible to see within the 
narrative various voices that advocate for various political agendas.
 Thus, for example, one polemical voice in the narrative appears to 
be condemning the forms of worship encouraged by King Jeroboam’s 
Northern Kingdom of Israel—whose central shrines involved the 
worship of God enthroned on golden calves—by associating such 
calves with idolatry and orgiastic celebrations. Why would an author 
condemn the Northern Kingdom’s temples in this way? An author 
might do so if the author came from the rival Southern Kingdom of 
Judah, which at its central Temple in Jerusalem imagined the God of 
Israel enthroned on golden cherubs rather than on golden calves, and 
was eager to ridicule and delegitimize the Israelite shrines in the north.
 Or, for example, the narrative—with its emphasis that “Aaron had 
let [the people] get out of control” (Exodus 32:25)39 —also appears to 
contain a polemical voice condemning the family of Aaron, the leaders 
of the religious establishment in the Southern Kingdom of Judah. 
While condemning that family, it praises other Levites, emphasizing 
the piety of the levitical priests whose violence is applauded and who 
emerge as the heroes of the narrative. Why would an author implicate 
Aaron’s family but praise other Levites? An author might do so if the 
author was a Levite who was—as all (non-Aaronide) Levites were—
excluded from the priesthood by the politically powerful priests who 
traced their ancestry to Aaron. As many historical-critical scholars 
have concluded, the golden calf narrative was likely written or edited by 
writers pointing to the supremacy of the Jerusalem Temple and, at the 
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same time, the legitimacy of priests from beyond the family of Aaron.40 
 The scholars who suggest the political motivations behind the 
golden calf story may resemble the philosophers in Plato’s allegory 
of the cave who expose how myths and norms are constructed by 
“puppeteer” mythmakers and legislators who may be seeking above 
all to assert their own power. Exposing how individuals with certain 
political interests gained the power to produce the texts that came 
to be included in the Bible, historical-critical scholarship can help 
to guard against the dangerous traditionalist assumption that these 
texts are perfect, divine creations. This mode of scholarship helps 
to remind us that images of God and claims of divine favor for 
particular priesthoods or particular temples—like the non-Aaronide 
priesthood, or the Temple in Jerusalem that featured cherubs rather 
than calves—have been shaped by human political ambitions and are 
not of ultimate value. Such scholarship reminds us not to bow down 
before and idolize such human creations, even if we—like prisoners 
in a cave—have been long accustomed to thinking of these creations 
as being inherently holy.
 And such scholarship can help us to resist the call, attributed by 
the Torah to Moses and by Moses to God, to divide communities 
into believers and idolaters and to strike out with pious certainty 
against brothers, neighbors, and kin who seem to cast their lot with 
the idolaters.41 When we are habituated to such a call, it is difficult to 
turn our necks and to raise up our eyes to see beyond the puppeteers 
who have crafted our sacred texts. But historical-critical scholarship, 
reminding us that the language attributed to God in sacred texts 
reflects the motivations of its authors, can help us to lift up our eyes 
toward an infinite ideal that exceeds their perspectives—toward the 
Good, “the name of the Holy One” that reaches “beyond all of the 
blessings and hymns and praises and consolations that are spoken in 
the world.”
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The Philosophical Task of Critiquing the Critics
Those who are engaged in scholarship of any sort often have an 
honorable hope that their study will illuminate the darkness—as did 
the ancient sage Rava, discussed in the introduction to this essay. 
Rava, citing Job, suggested that proper study (sidra or seder) would 
bring order (seder) and light to “a land whose light is like darkness, 
the deepest gloom and disorder.” So too, those of us who teach the 
art of biblical criticism, exploring the possible motivations of the 
authors who stand behind scriptural texts, may often think that we 
are bringing light and order to an otherwise opaque and confusing 
text. We can shed light, for example, on the mystery of why a story 
regarding a golden calf is included at all in the Bible, and why Aaron 
is at least partially blamed for the episode, and why the Levites 
turn out to be such heroic holy warriors on the side of God and 
Moses.42  Historical-critical scholars may also be dedicated to the 
task of growing in virtue, moving toward the Good by developing 
intellectual virtues of openness, honesty, and integrity, taking the 
intellectual virtues that Simḥah Zissel Ziv saw in Socrates more 
seriously than a traditionalist like Simḥah Zissel was himself willing 
to do.
 Thus, for example, as the biblical scholar Robert Coote put it in a 
2008 essay on teaching the historical-critical method, that method 
above all should “foster inquisitiveness” and seek “virtues, or qualities 
of character, that contribute to critical learning. These include 
openness, honesty, courage, patience, humility, and sense of humor.” 
Those are, Coote explains, virtues that he prays for at the beginning 
of the courses on the Bible that he teaches.43 Such virtues are essential 
for the task of resisting certainty, for critical learning requires making 
tentative judgments but always resisting certainty. As Coote affirms 
in the name of communication theorist David Zarefsky: “To be 
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critical is to make provisional judgments before an audience about 
matters that are significant but uncertain, by use of evidence and 
reasoning, in the common pursuit of truth or good decision, with a 
willingness to run the risk of being wrong.”44 Individuals are limited 
“by enculturation, experience, and feeling” and, moreover, “because 
the Bible was written through a process unlike our own and which we 
do not well understand, and in different times, places, and languages, 
interpreting the Bible always involves significant uncertainty.”45 Thus, 
“criticism starts by doubting that I understand.”46 
 Coote seems to echo the commitment to uncertainty and 
continual growth in learning that Simḥah Zissel saw as shared by 
Jewish “disciples of the sages” and by Socrates. But whereas Simḥah 
Zissel was unable to question his own assumptions regarding the 
perfection of the Torah (and this may well have constricted his 
ability to continually grow), Coote rejects theological dogmatism 
and appears to embrace a deeper epistemic humility, recognizing the 
limits of his knowledge.
 Still, historical-critical scholars, like all of us, may have their own 
limiting and dogmatic assumptions. Coote, though he may be an 
exemplar of the scholar who resists certainty, has in fact been criticized 
for his own overconfident claims regarding the meaning of the Bible. 
In an essay on historical-critical Bible scholarship, Jon Levenson 
points to the 1990 book that Coote co-authored with his wife, Mary 
P. Coote, Power, Politics, and the Making of the Bible,47 as illustrative 
of the dogmatic certitude to which historical-critical scholars may 
succumb. In that volume, Levenson points out, the Cootes seem to 
claim that, because they understand the original political contexts 
in which biblical texts were composed, they can identify political 
motivations of authors and therefore they can hold themselves 
up as ultimate authorities who, “unlike those they study, know 
what they are doing.”48 Levenson sees the Cootes succumbing to a 
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common temptation for historical-critical scholars: the “temptation 
to interpret the text as ideology, that is, as only a justification for 
political arrangements.”49 From this sort of perspective, the work 
of learning from the golden calf narrative is accomplished once 
the political motivations of those who opposed Jeroboam in the 
Northern Kingdom, or opposed the Aaronide priesthood in the 
Southern Kingdom, have been exposed. The Bible can seemingly 
play no role in guiding readers toward the pursuit of the Good in 
any other way. Rather, Levenson argues, “Power, Politics, and the 
Making of the Bible slams shut many of the portals to transcendence 
that religiously committed historical critics have, in a variety of ways, 
been struggling to keep open since the Enlightenment.” 50
 The Cootes, I imagine, could defend themselves against these 
charges; at least by the time he wrote his 2008 essay, Robert Coote 
would insist on uncertainty and disavow any mode of scholarship 
that too readily shuts any “portals to transcendence.” Indeed, as he 
indicates there, he encourages the cultivation of virtues through 
exercises that include prayer before study;51 perhaps he might 
encourage his Jewish students to recite the words of the Kaddish 
following a study session. Still, Levenson’s general concerns about 
historical-critical scholarship are worth taking seriously. Scholars 
certainly can, at times, slam shut portals of transcendence if they 
insist that the meanings of sacred texts are limited to the political 
motivations of their authors, and if they disparage readers who study 
texts in pursuit of a vision of the Good that extends “beyond all 
of the blessings and hymns and praises and consolations that are 
spoken in the world.”
 Historical-critical scholars may sometimes see themselves as 
philosophers in the style of the “Enlightenment”—philosophers 
who bring light into the cave, helping to turn prisoners around so 
that prisoners can see the puppeteers who have created myths simply 
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to legitimate their own power.52 The former prisoners may feel that 
they have been fully freed from their bondage, but their “enlighteners” 
are not in fact teaching them to seek portals that would allow them 
to glance beyond the cave. Scholars may, in fact, be re-enslaving 
prisoners under new assumptions, positioning themselves as the new 
puppeteers—who may not be seeking to transmit the Good to the 
prisoners at all, but may rather be (unconsciously or consciously) 
asserting their own power. “Might it be the case that the interpretation 
of religion as only a mystification of power arrangements,” Levenson 
asks, “is itself an item in a discourse of power in which a new group, 
supported by new social arrangements, asserts its hegemony?”53 
 Levenson’s criticism of historical critics—as he puts it, “suspecting 
the hermeneuts of suspicion”54 (or, in the language of Peter Berger, 
“relativizing the relativizers”)55—offers an important corrective for 
those historical critics who overrate the enlightening powers of their 
criticism. Historical criticism can help cultivate the many virtues that 
Coote has named, and it can help to inspire the pursuit of the Good for 
all the reasons that I have suggested above. But it is limited in the way 
that all human traditions are limited, and it emphasizes intellectual 
virtues while generally doing little to aid in the development of moral 
virtues. Simḥah Zissel Ziv would surely have developed a greater 
intellectual openness if he were to have studied the golden calf narrative 
with historical-critical scholars in a contemporary academic setting; 
but, so too, we could imagine historical-critical scholars benefitting 
from meditating on the golden calf narrative as was done in Simḥah 
Zissel’s yeshivas, where the ideal of continual moral growth was above 
all linked with virtues of lovingkindness and compassion that are 
often overlooked in contemporary academic settings.56 Many critical 
scholars would surely find Simḥah Zissel to be stiff-necked, “not able 
to turn his neck to listen,” “not able to turn from the habit to which 
he had been habituated”;57 but many critical scholars would also have 
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their own resistances to turning their own necks to the moral horizons 
toward which a thinker like Simḥah Zissel would point.58 All of us, 
wherever we stand, would do well to realize the limitations of our own 
visions of learning and seek to grow further. Those of us seeking to 
contribute to the Jewish tradition might benefit from turning to the 
words of the Kaddish after study, reminding ourselves of how far we 
are from the infinite goodness represented by “the name of the Holy 
One” and how we are obligated to continue to grow and learn.
Conclusions: Revisiting Rava and His Legacy
The human obligation to magnify and sanctify God’s name in the 
world—to increase goodness in the world—is an obligation that 
can be fulfilled through many paths. There are many ways that 
goodness can be increased in the world, so that “God’s great name” 
is “magnified and sanctified.” But study can play a key role in the 
process; for Jews, it is appropriate that engagement with Torah is 
linked with the Kaddish and the hope for the sanctification of God’s 
name in the world. The study of Torah can provide a vision of striving 
in pursuit of the moral ideal that God’s name represents, as Simḥah 
Zissel Ziv found in the golden calf story. The study of Torah can also 
point to the limits of humanly shaped Torah and the way in which 
God’s infinite name points us beyond those limitations. The words of 
the Kaddish can remind us of how distant we are from this infinite 
goodness, but can also remind us that we are obligated to continue 
to reach toward its light, even though we know that we will never 
reach it.
 As we have seen, Rava first pointed to the illuminating power 
of the words of the Kaddish amidst the darkness that followed 
the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. We might join him in 
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hoping that the study of sacred texts and the words of the Kaddish 
can provide light and hope, and we might join him in thinking about 
how these words function for Jews who today continue to have no 
central Jerusalem Temple.
 By directing his students’ attention to ways in which study could 
sustain the world, Rava may have been turning their attention away 
from the Temple—perhaps responding, in part, to Jews who thought 
that the Temple marked the one spot on earth that could serve as a 
true portal to God’s infinite goodness. As I have suggested in this essay, 
one might learn through study to doubt that narrative regarding the 
significance of the Jerusalem Temple. Through study, one might come 
to see the Temple as a concession following the golden calf episode 
and not as an ideal form—but one might also join Maimonides in 
appreciating the need for concessions when dealing with stiff-necked 
human beings, and affirm that the Temple could indeed provide a 
path to God. Or, through study, one might come to see the Jerusalem 
Temple as the project of kings and priests seeking political power, 
buttressed by narratives like the golden calf narrative that ridiculed 
and sought to delegitimize alternative temples—but one might also 
join Jon Levenson in understanding that texts and traditions outlive 
the political motivations that may have led to their creation. The 
words of the Kaddish may remind us that the texts and traditions that 
we study reflect limited perspectives and that God transcends them; 
but they may also remind us that these texts and traditions have the 
potential to guide us toward that transcendent horizon.
 The recitation of the Kaddish is itself a tradition that has outlived 
the motivations that may have led to its creation. Rava himself may 
well have thought that the darkness of the world would ultimately be 
dispelled if “God’s kingdom” (a phrase also used in the Kaddish) were 
established through the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem and 
the reinstitution of its sacrificial system. But his effort to highlight 
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the power of study can inspire new hopes for how the darkness of 
the world can, instead, be slowly challenged through study itself—if 
study is carried out with all the virtues that it requires and opens up 
new portals for moral goodness in the world, making the world more 
like a world that we could call “God’s kingdom.”59 
 For those of us today who see God’s great name as a moral 
archetype toward which we are called, we need all the reminders 
that we can get to always be more thoughtful, more loving, and more 
just, and reminding ourselves of God’s great name can be a source of 
inspiration. The Kaddish offers us no promises of enlightenment or 
redemption, but its words may guide us to look for insight and for 
glimpses of the Good—encounters with God—in all of our studies.
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